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Social Welfare Computing is an emerging discipline 
that seeks to direct technology to cause minimum social 
disruption, and in particular seeks to minimize the harm 
caused directly by technology.  This is markedly differ-
ent from the better understood strategic use of technol-
ogy to create value or to address existing social needs.  
Innovative technologies that are widely adopted created 
significant value for their users; otherwise they would 
not be widely adopted.  Often the companies that create 
them obtain new sources of wealth and power, which 
inevitably lead to new abuses of power and new forms 
of societal disruption.  Societal disruption in turn re-
quires social adaptation, including new regulations to 
influence the behavior of firms and to define and to pro-
tect the rights of an individual in the changed society.   
Social Welfare Computing seeks to guide social adap-
tation, combining insights from disciplines as varied as 
anthropology, business strategy, economics, strategic 
planning, and law. 
1. Introduction 
We are hearing repeated claims that Big Tech has 
gotten too big and too powerful, and that it needs to be 
regulated and restrained. We have reviewed several 
hundred articles describing these claims in order to for-
mulate a comprehensive list of problem areas. These 
claims are most frequently directed against Facebook, 
Amazon, Apple, and Google, and the most commonly 
proposed regulatory fix is the traditional sanction ap-
plied to monopolies, breaking the companies up into 
smaller companies that compete with each other. How-
ever, many of the problems that have been created by 
Big Tech are not caused by the companies’ size or mo-
nopoly status, and applying antimonopoly sanctions 
may be both unnecessary and ineffective. 
The four largest online companies have enormous 
power, have transformed traditional consumer services, 
and have disrupted society in ways we are just begin-
ning to understand. Although the largest tech companies 
receive the most coverage and the harm they can poten-
tially cause receives the most media attention, we will 
also address other technology firms, especially in the 
sharing economy, and explore the unanticipated effects 
that they have created. 
Our research deals with minimizing the harm 
caused by technology’s rapid disruption of society, 
which is how we have defined Social Welfare Compu-
ting [4, 6]. This has received almost no academic study. 
Many of our colleagues have studied the benefits and 
the value created by large scale technological innova-
tion. Others have studied the use of technology to ad-
dress existing social problems and to improve education 
and social services. But there has been very little study 
of the downside of computing, the forms of harm caused 
by technological progress, and the reduction or mitiga-
tion of those problems 
2. Motivation for Our Research Program 
and Overview of its Structure 
We are conducting a large research program ad-
dressing the emerging discipline of social welfare com-
puting [4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 24]. We acknowledge the 
extent to which computing both improves aggregate 
wealth and aggregate social welfare but feel the need to 
explore the burdens it imposes on some segments of so-
ciety, perhaps unfairly. Big Tech’s power, and the ex-
tent of the resulting transformation and disruption, are 
only possible because of the widespread adoption of 
technology-driven innovation, and this adoption results 
from obvious and immediate benefits. Historically, dis-
ruption and transformation create losers as well as win-
ners. The speed with which Big Tech firms have 
emerged is unprecedented. As a society, how should we 
and when should we act to protect those who are harmed, 
and who makes the tradeoffs among the value created 
and the resulting sources of harm? 
We avoid expressing our own opinions whenever 
possible and avoid statements like “big data firms mon-
etize personal information by invading privacy, which 
is bad.” We focus on specific dichotomies, like “big data 
and private information make markets more efficient, 
which is good. However, these practices reduce con-
sumer surplus and results in differential pricing, which 
may be considered unfair, both of which are seen as bad.” 
Wherever possible, we report the opinions of 






affected segments of society, like parents who may be 
concerned about privacy and data mining their chil-
dren’s texts, or how users feel about the possibility that 
Facebook may be complicit in fake news campaigns that 
seek to manipulate their opinions and may even seek to 
manipulate the outcome of elections. The opinions have 
been obtained through interviews, focus groups, and 
large international surveys. 
This is a report on a large ongoing multi-year and 
multi-disciplinary international research project. It in-
volves studies conducted in the US, in Japan, Korea, and 
China, in Denmark, France, Germany, and the UK, and 
in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, and Mexico. 
Work was done with faculty colleagues in all of the first 
eight countries, involving disciplines like information 
technology and computer science, information econom-
ics and business strategy, law, and anthropology. 
Our ultimate goal is to inform public debate and 
policy discussions, and, ultimately to propose regulation 
of Big Tech to maximize social welfare, however soci-
ety and its representatives choose to define social wel-
fare. We are not arguing that Big Tech is good or bad, 
or that Big Tech firms are or are not too big, or that they 
do or do not enjoy or abuse monopoly power. We are 
presenting issues for discussion and moving towards the 
creation of policy recommendations. In this paper we 
neither propose nor test hypotheses. However, we be-
lieve that the rigor of our analyses and the structure of 
our research program allows us to avoid proposing a sin-
gle viewpoint and allows us to guide regulatory policy. 
Our research program is a portfolio of interrelated 
Projects, in six Phases. See figure 1, below, which ex-
plains our research plan. It shows how the Projects fit 
into Phases. The first Phase is Motivation and the 
Demonstration of the Existence of Problems, which 
comprises four Projects. This Phase of research is im-
portant because it provides the first motivation for our 
work in assessing the costs and benefits of technological 
innovation, namely a demonstration that there is a doc-
umented history of complaints. The Projects are Recent 
History of Privacy Litigation, Recent History of Abuse 
of Power from New Business Models, Recent History of 
Fake News and Societal Interventions, and Recent His-
tory of Complaints about Externalities. The fourth goes 
beyond our prior publications and involves complaints 
about sharing economy platforms, such as Airbnb’s and 
Uber’s impact on communities. We will elaborate on 
this in section 6.1 of the paper, where we discuss Phase 
4. 
The second Phase is Theoretical Background and 
Historical Precedent, which comprises three Projects. 
This Phase of research is important because it uses evi-
dence from early millennia of human civilization, and 
technologies dating back to the agricultural revolution, 
to demonstrate that technology always alters the struc-
ture of society and that these changes always produce 
winners, losers, and new forms of abuse. When these 
abuses become sufficiently harmful to social cohesion 
they produce changes in the implicit and explicit social 
contracts, and changes in the laws regulating commer-
cial behavior. The three Projects are Technology and So-
cial Structure, Technology and Social Contract, and 
Technology and the Law. These will not be reviewed in 
further detail in this paper. 
The third Phase is Recent Historical Precedent and 
Lessons from the Industrial Revolution. The industrial 
revolution provided the motivation for the first major 
period of industrial regulation, and this Phase comprises 
three projects. This Phase of research is important be-
cause demonstrates the set of tools available to society 
and to its regulators for dealing with large technology 
firms, and prepares us to explore the limitations of these 
tools for mitigating today’s problems in Phase Four. 
The Projects are Industrial Revolution and Social Struc-
ture, Industrial Revolution and the Social Contract, and 
Industrial Revolution and Regulation. 
The fourth Phase is Drawing Lessons from Histor-
ical Precedent. This Phase represents more recent re-
search, and the work from this Phase is presented in sec-
tion 3. This Phase of research is important because 
demonstrates that the set of available tools is not per-
fectly designed for mitigating today’s problems, and al-
lows us to explore what additional remedies might be 
appropriate. The four Projects are Monopoly Law and 
its Limitations, Consumer Safety / Transparency and 
Labeling Requirements / and their Limitations, Regula-
tion of Externalities and its Limitations, and Regulation 
of New Business Models and Limitations.  
The fifth Phase is Assessment of Current Levels of 
Support for Regulatory Intervention. This phase com-
prises four Projects, Interviews with European Execu-
tives Exploring American Domination, Consumer Sur-
veys / Trust in Facebook and Google / Trust in Regula-
tors / Willingness to Change, Student and Parental Sur-
veys of Teen Behavior and the Need for Protection, and 
Surveys of European Executives Exploring American 
Domination and Need for Regulation. This Phase of re-
search is important because is assesses EU executives’ 
beliefs that they need regulatory protection. It also as-
sesses consumers’ satisfaction with current regulation, 
trust in dominant net platform operators, and willing-
ness to accept further regulation. The two most recently 
completed projects are summarized in section 7 and rep-
resent one of the paper’s major contributions beyond 
our previously published research. 
 The sixth and final Phase is Policy Recommenda-
tions, which comprises a single Project, Implications for 
Policy and Regulatory Recommendations. This Phase 
can’t be completed until we complete all prior Phases. 
When completed, this Phase of research will be the most 
important contribution of our entire research program. 
Preliminary findings are presented in section 8.    
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3. Problems Created by the Internet / 
Digital Revolution for Which Regula-
tors Have Solutions 
3.1.Economies of Scale as a Source of Power 
in Online Platforms  
Virtually all software exhibits extreme economies 
of scale. Development costs are high, as in many forms 
of innovation, but with digital downloads the cost of 
producing and selling additional copies has dropped to 
zero. Virtually all software, like MS Windows and MS 
Office, enjoys enormous competitive advantage in part 
because its average per-copy cost, as well its marginal 
cost, are lower than any smaller competitor could match. 
Google Search also enjoys advantage because the larger 
its user base the faster its search results adapt to chang-
ing conditions in the external world.   
3.2.Traditional Network Effects 
Communications networks, from traditional teleph-
ony to social media networks like Facebook and Twitter, 
gain their value in large measure from the number of 
users they have. The value increases faster than the 
number of network users. With limited interconnectiv-
ity and dedicated hardware, early networks emerged as 
natural monopolies. Today, limited interconnectivity is 
often artificially imposed as a means of achieving mo-
nopoly power or extending it into new domains [3].  
3.3.Economies of Scope and Positive Exter-
nalities on the Supply Side 
Users gain value from increasing the number of 
participants on the other side of the market. When Mi-
crosoft’s DOS became the most widely used operating 
system other than Apple’s it attracted more software de-
velopers, which attracted more users, eventually reach-
ing a tipping point and virtually eliminating its compet-
itors. Numerous other examples have been studied [23].  
4. Problems Created by the Internet / 
Digital Revolution for Which Regula-
tors Do Not Have Solutions 
4.1.The Externality Problems Caused by 
Online Platforms 
Modern software platforms have impacts beyond 
their users, and these are very different from traditional 
externalities like congestion or pollution. Negative ex-
ternalities occur when users of a product or service gain 
value themselves, but cause harm to others. Markets 
rarely solve problems with externalities because the in-
dividuals who cause harm do not suffer harm them-
selves, and may even be unaware of the harm they cause. 
Users love Uber because of its convenience, speed, and 
low cost, but may increase urban pollution and traffic 
congestion by shifting users away from more efficient 
mass transit. Airbnb provides users the ability to live in 
historical neighborhoods on vacation but this displaces 
long-term residents, who have come to despise Airbnb.   
4.2.Platform Envelopment 
A platform is a core system that can readily be ex-
tended. Platform envelopment involves the combination 
of the following three characteristics: (1) Monopoly 
control over the core system, (2) Super-additive value 
creation as each additional application added to the core 
creates more value for users, including increasing the 
value of the core and some or all of the applications al-
ready added, and (3) the ability to deliberately reduce 
access to the core or to deny access to the core entirely, 
to cripple potential competitors [3]. 
Platform envelopment strategies have existed for 
decades. The Radio Commission, the precursor of the 
Federal Communications Commission, was created to 
address the first occurrence of platform envelopment, 
when AT&T leveraged its control over long distance te-
lephony to create a monopoly in radio networks [3].  
Platform envelopment has become much more 
prevalent with the increased importance of software 
platforms [6]. The best known examples involve Mi-
crosoft [3, 8] and Google [3, 29].  
It is easy to view platform envelopment as an op-
portunity for all businesses to develop their own plat-
form strategies [21]. This is probably dangerously mis-
guided. Dominant platforms are already well-estab-
lished. Android is already free both to users and to hard-
ware vendors, and it enjoys enormous network benefits 
from millions of apps available. 
There are few remedies available. The Essential 
Facilities Doctrine would limit the abuse of platforms 
like Android. It might be argued that Android is now an 
essential facility for app developers who wish to sell to 
users of non-Apple devices. Duty to Deal argues that a 
firm cannot refuse to work with a competitor it has 
worked with previously, solely for commercial reasons 
[13]. Neither of these is universally accepted legal doc-
trine, and the EU is currently treating platform envelop-
ment as a novel abuse of monopoly power. 
4.3.Deceptive, Dangerous, and Addictive 
Social Media Products 
 Facebook’s role in the crafting and dissemination 
of fake news has been widely reported [30, 20]. Face-
book’s role in radicalization and recruiting for extremist 
organizations has been widely reported [1]. Facebook 
played a role spreading rumors during periods of unrest 
and dangerous medical misinformation, as they are do-
ing during the current pandemic.   
Search can be dangerously and deliberately inaccu-
rate, as with Google’s support of illegal smuggling of 
counterfeit pharmaceuticals through dummy websites 
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established to look as if they were Canadian [28]. 
Users are enticed to use more and more applications 
on a single platform, and the more they use, the more 
the platform learns about them. The more that platform 
learns about them the better the platform’s services be-
come. The dark side of this capture and integration of 
information is better manipulation of the users, better 
targeted marketing, and better precision pricing. As 
firms learn to price products and services to match each 
individual’s willingness to pay markets do become 
more efficient, but consumer surplus is also reduced; 
that is, more and more of the value of technology is ap-
propriated by the provider, not by the user. 
The easiest approach to limiting the harm from de-
ceptive, harmful, and addictive products would be label-
ing, and this would work if users care enough to act dif-
ferently if they did know. However, there is evidence 
that by itself labeling to increase transparency may not 
be effective. This has been observed in products as di-
verse as cigarettes and fake news [25]. 
Freedom of speech makes it difficult to prohibit all 
but the most abusive material. Moreover, Facebook ar-
gues that its use of personal information to target fake 
news to the most responsive readers is part of its core 
strategy of ensuring that users see the content that is 
most interesting to them, which is protected even within 
the EU’s GDPR.  
One recommendation is to regulate social network-
ing platforms as harmful and addictive products, much 
as we regulate tobacco and alcohol, as suggested by Pro-
fessor Jan Trzaskowski of Copenhagen Business School. 
Alternatively, they could be regulated as unsafe public 
spaces, as suggested by Professor Amanda Shanor of 
The Wharton School. 
4.4.New Problems — Gateways and Third 
Party Payer Systems 
Google and Amazon control critical online gate-
ways. Amazon, and its Alexa, and Google, and its 
online assistant, are becoming dominant forces in post-
pandemic retailing, with power and reach well beyond 
that of any traditional retailers. 
Perhaps the most interesting business model of the 
internet is the combination of an online gateway with 
a third-party payer system.  Google is essential for us-
ers who want to find sellers, and sellers know this; hence 
sellers are willing to pay to be found, and willing to pay 
to avoid being hidden from buyers. Over time search 
platforms have become essential, and have mastered the 
art of charging sellers to be found, and of transferring 
part of the payments they receive to buyers to maintain 
their loyalty. When search engines compete they actu-
ally increase rather than decrease the prices they charge 
sellers to be found and then increase the payment to us-
ers to buy more loyalty. These mandatory participation 
third party payer systems are perhaps unique; they 
appear to be the only businesses where competition 
causes the competitors to increase the prices they charge 
their customers, and then use the revenues to buy loyalty. 
These reverse price wars are successful because party-
1, the users, do not know about or care about the prices 
charged to party-3, the sellers, and because party-3 has 
no choice. If users use only one search platform, which 
is true of most users, then party-3 has to participate in 
all platforms, and cannot reject a platform simply be-
cause it has become more expensive. There may not be 
a market solution that can eliminate reverse price wars. 
These are still a serious problem today, four decades af-
ter the first legal judgments against them [3]. 
Precision pricing and abuse of the most needy 
and least informed has been discussed briefly as one of 
the dangers of harmful and addictive platform usage. 
Fully informed sellers can exploit perfect information, 
can perform perfect price discrimination, and can ex-
tract an increasing fraction of the value created by inno-
vation [31]. This is efficient pricing, and marketers and 
economists have dreamed of it for years. Is efficient 
pricing always appropriate? As a society, do we agree? 
And if not, how do we prohibit it? There is no market 
solution. Companies that can attract and retain the most 
profitable customers always outperform their competi-
tors [3]. 
We are experiencing unprecedented concentration 
of economic and political power without necessary 
regulatory checks. No company in history has ever 
grown to $250 billion as quickly as Facebook, and no 
company has ever grown ubiquitous as quickly as Face-
book. Facebook is global and there are no checks or re-
strictions that prohibit its being used to encourage gen-
ocide in Myanmar, or to recruit for the Islamic state, or 
to support dictatorship in the Philippines [1]. 
Do we have consensus on our right to regulate Big 
Tech or on what forms of regulation are appropriate? 
Would the firms even permit regulation? Or have they 
become so powerful, so able to manipulate legislators 
through lobbying, and so able to manipulate consumers’ 
views that they are now beyond regulation? 
4.5.New Problems — Emergence of Power-
ful Life Control Interfaces 
Smartphones and at-home digital assistants have 
become far more than phones, and indeed far more than 
devices for communicating with other people. They 
have become our life control interfaces [24]. They con-
tain our schedules, our plans, our to-do-lists, our con-
tacts, our photographs. They are our indispensable cy-
bernetically enhanced memories. They are our access 
points to the net, including our access to search and to 
shopping, and to services ranging from restaurant deliv-
ery to taxis and other forms of local transportation. We 
use them to manage our schedules, order our groceries, 
control our music and our television and even the 
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lighting in our homes. They provide real-time directions, 
and even when we do not let them actually control our 
movements we let them influence or decide our move-
ments for us. 
Life control interfaces influence, and even deter-
mine, what we buy and where and when we buy it. As 
the emerging internet of things enhances the power of 
smart appliances and autonomous vehicles, life control 
interfaces will become increasingly important, and their 
American owners will gain dangerous power over the 
behavior of all European consumers. 
Platforms are increasingly not neutral agents that 
we control. Increasingly, these life control interfaces 
have their own agendas, and subtly control our lives 
while we believe we are controlling ourselves [31. If we 
ask Alexa to get us six cans of lentil soup, we know 
where she is going to shop. She will direct the order to 
one of Amazon’s own operations, but at least she will 
probably order our favorite brand. If we ask Google to 
get us the same thing, both the brand and the price are 
certain to be acceptable, but both the brand and the store 
will be determined by algorithms like those used for 
sponsored search. With Alexa many retailers are 
squeezed out of the distribution channel, and with 
Google retailers and manufacturers once again are 
forced to pay to participate.  
Consumers are not harmed in any obviously way, 
and will increasingly become dependent upon their life 
control interfaces. But competition is harmed, and re-
tailers will increasingly be harmed by this new form of 
anticompetitive behavior. Likewise, consumers will not 
be able to obtain the full range of value from their smart 
cars without a relationship between the car manufac-
turer and the owner of the interface, Android or iOS. 
Likewise, manufacturers will not be able to achieve the 
full range of value from their smart home appliances 
without a relationship between the car manufacturer and 
the owner of the interface, Android or iOS.   
5. Why is it so Hard to Develop Appropri-
ate Responses to the Power of Big Tech? 
It has been extremely difficult to develop a strategy 
for responding to the power of Big Tech companies. We 
cannot agree on the questions to ask. We cannot agree 
on what regulation should look like or on what social 
policy should look like until we agree on what problems 
we are facing and how we would know when we found 
an appropriate solution.   
It’s impossible to implement any solution without 
consensus on what the problem actually is. It’s impos-
sible to implement any solution without an understand-
ing of individuals’ objectives and without understand-
ing the tradeoffs among them. Without this understand-
ing we would lack public support for any proposed so-
lution. That’s why we have conducted extensive survey 
research, in order to understand consumer behavior. 
This is described in detail in section 7. 
Similarly, we will need to understand the concerns 
of executives in industries directly affected by the 
power of Big Tech, its power over existing gateways to 
control access to consumers, and the emerging power of 
life control interfaces like Alexa. 
And we will need to understand how to teach peo-
ple to make decisions in their own long-term best inter-
est, which includes understanding motivation and self-
control, and both analytical and intuitive decision-mak-
ing. This is described in detail in section 7. 
This is why we are arguing so insistently for inter-
disciplinary research. The relevant disciplines obvi-
ously include information economics and business strat-
egy, to understand what Big Tech firms want to do, and 
how different regulatory restraints would affect their 
ability to act in ways that regulators deem undesirable. 
They would also include regulatory policy and regula-
tory economics. We will also need to include anthropol-
ogy, sociology, and consumer psychology, so that we 
know what consumers do and do not already understand, 
what consumers do and do not want, and what consum-
ers will and will not accept both from their services pro-
viders and from their governments. Without this it will 
be impossible to design a regulatory policy that consum-
ers will accept. There are lessons that must be learned 
from Big Tech’s ability to derail both the US Congress 
and the US Senate’s attempts to limit online theft and 
republication of protected content. 
6. What Responses are Appropriate to the 
Problems of Digital Transformation of 
Business and Society? 
The most common recommendation in response to 
Big Tech is to apply antimonopoly law more strictly 
[17]. Historically, many problems have not been solva-
ble through antimonopoly law. The harm from tobacco 
addiction was not caused by the monopoly power of any 
individual tobacco company, but by lack of transpar-
ency regarding harm, by powerful advertising and lob-
bying efforts, and by humans’ well-known inability to 
trade off immediate benefits against long-term harm. 
The solution was a combination of mandatory labeling, 
increased taxes, and outright ban on sale to minors. The 
problem of lead in gasoline was not caused by the mo-
nopoly power of gasoline companies around the world, 
but again by lobbying and lack of transparency concern-
ing future harm. The problem was solved by actions 
banning leaded gasoline in the entire industrialized 
world and by requiring automobile companies to pro-
duce vehicles that did not require leaded gasoline. The 
problems of externalities — harm to others caused by 
our own economic activities — are not caused by mo-
nopolies. The most obvious examples, such as air and 
water pollution, are not caused because coal companies, 
other extractive industries companies, refineries, and 
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chemical companies are monopolies. They are caused 
by a lack of transparency: we cannot immediately judge 
the harm we are causing others. And they are caused by 
a lack of altruism: we don’t care about the harm our ac-
tivities cause others. The problems of defective, harmful, 
or addictive products were not caused by monopoly 
power.  
Additionally, some of the problems we face today 
are without precedent. The power of platform envelop-
ment is not caused directly by the existence of a monop-
oly, but by the leverage of that monopoly to create ad-
ditional power in other areas of economic activity.   
6.1.What Solutions are Appropriate for Ex-
ternalities? 
Uber increases traffic congestion and increases air 
pollution by reducing reliance on more fuel-efficient 
public transportation. Airbnb alters neighborhoods, al-
lowing residential housing to be converted to commer-
cial near-hotels and forcing out long-time residents. 
And yet city-dwellers love Uber, and tourists and many 
parts of the tourism industry love Airbnb. 
There is no universal solution. Solutions need to be 
negotiated locally among all stakeholders. But who 
should be consulted? Should hotels be represented, 
since they are harmed? How can foreign tourists be rep-
resented in local analysis of tradeoffs? 
6.2.What Solutions are Appropriate for 
Platform Envelopment? 
There has been little academic study of the prob-
lems of platform envelopment, although regulators are 
beginning to act. The Department of Justice litigation 
against Microsoft was at its core about platform envel-
opment. The record-setting €4.34 billion judgment of 
the EU Competition Commission against Google was 
likewise about platform envelopment and about denying 
competitors equal access to their Android platform. 
Since platform envelopment revolves around deny-
ing access to an essential platform, an effective solution 
would require allowing unrestricted access. This re-
quires that a firm provides services to its competitors. 
Duty to deal in the US is usually applied only when a 
company that had been providing services ceases to do 
so solely for anticompetitive reasons [14]. Likewise, alt-
hough the Essential Facilities Doctrine [22] was effec-
tively used in litigation against American Airlines’ 
abuse of Sabre and to compel AT&T to provide MCI 
access to individual subscribers’ phones, it is now sel-
dom employed either in American or EU litigation. 
Analysis is complicated in part because consumers do 
benefit from the super-additive value created by the 
platform operator [3]. The key decision is determining 
a fair price that the platform owners charge for access. 
6.3.What is the Appropriate Remedy for 
Abuse of Control of Gateways? 
Abuse of gateways is a dominant online business 
model, especially when combined with third party payer 
systems and reverse price wars. Consumers rarely see 
the indirect costs they create for themselves by using 
free search.  Search engines are not required to provide 
consumers with the best possible search results, and 
sometimes, when the profits are large enough, they will 
return search results that are actually dangerous and 
harmful. The most extreme examples involved 
Google’s facilitating illegal drug smuggling into the 
United States [27].  
But harmful search results are rare today.  Google 
has learned that allowing inferior suppliers to purchase 
top spots in search is rarely good business.  Consumers 
would learn to distrust paid search results, which would 
be catastrophic for Google’s business model.  And it is 
more profitable to provide the top spots in sponsored 
search to suppliers that consumers will actually click on, 
since that produces revenue.  Google uses a combination 
of the seller’s quality score and the seller’s bid to deter-
mine its location in the search results it shows users.  
Google reserves the right to adjust quality scores in or-
der to extract as much money as it chooses to extract 
from winning bidders, but it rarely shows truly inferior 
sellers to consumers any more.  It uses the threat of not 
showing a particular seller as a mechanism for extract-
ing high prices even from sellers who should automati-
cally show up at the top of search.   
Some of the profits extracted by the search engine 
are returned directly to consumers through a range of 
other services, making search engines appear to be more 
free than free. These payments are used to buy loyalty 
from users and to increase market share. As a result, 
competition among search engines actually increases 
the price they charge sellers to be found. Breaking up 
Google would not reduce the cost of keywords, or the 
costs sellers pay as a result of participating in search, 
but would actually increase them. Since a significant 
portion of higher costs are always passed along to con-
sumers, free search may ultimately prove to be the most 
expensive way of providing search. Since breaking up 
Google would only increase the cost of keywords, and 
thus would only increase the indirect costs of free search 
paid by consumers, we need another mechanism. Both 
the cost of keywords and preferencing of a search en-
gine’s own offerings above those of competitors have 
led to the imposition of massive fines by the EU’s Com-
petition Commissioner. 
Bracha and Pasquale have suggested the creation of 
a Federal Search Commission [2]. Their intent was to 
eliminate search bias and ensure that consumers obtain 
the best possible search results. But the FSC could also 
address two other problems created by the current 
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market for search. It could set tariffs and limit the costs 
imposed by any search. It could eliminate abuses such 
as preferencing the search engine’s own offerings ahead 
of those of other competitors.   
Regulation of search will not be easy. Our most re-
cent research suggests that even in 2020 consumers do 
not approve of Google’s behavior but would be reluc-
tant to share data with any Google competitor and would 
be reluctant to switch to a paid service even if it pre-
served their privacy [6, 15]. 
6.4.What Solutions are Appropriate for Re-
stricting the Use of Social Media for Ma-
nipulation? 
Social media are used to  manipulate public opinion, 
both in elections and in marketing. Social media are 
used to advocate extremist political or religious ideas, 
and to radicalize and recruit new members for a wide 
range of dangerous extremist groups. The problem has 
been called an existential threat to democracy [20], but 
Facebook has successfully defended its practices using 
arguments related to freedom of speech and to its use of 
data to as part of its core marketing strategy. 
Jaron Lanier has suggested that we all terminate our 
accounts and stop our use of social media [14], but 
Jaron’s readers are not among Facebook’s most suscep-
tible users. Mark Zuckerberg expressed no concern 
about a boycott by advertisers, since he was certain that 
they would all come back. 
6.5.What Solutions are Appropriate for 
Abuse of Life Control Interfaces?  
Life control interfaces require data to operate, and 
these are cospecialized assets in the sense described by 
Teece [27]; firms that control cospecialized assets are 
the firms that profit from innovations. Clemons and 
Row explain how this is especially true in information-
based innovations [7]. A smart car needs data in the 
user’s phone to arrange to pick up guests and drive them 
to dinner, a smart shopping assistant needs access to 
other information stored elsewhere in the user’s life 
control interface. No single automobile manufacturer, 
appliance manufacturer, or retailer can provide a com-
pelling reason for users to reenter their data or for them 
to adopt a new life control interface. Apple iOS, Google 
Assistant, and Amazon are here to stay. 
The most plausible response would be the creation 
of a single cooperative pan-EU life control interface that 
is transparent, regulated, and agnostic about where to 
shop and would have full access to the consumers’ data. 
The GDPR ensures that users own their data and that 
they have the right to download data to any competing 
platforms, but most users lack the patience, the skill, and 
the motivation to do so. A pan-EU life control interface 
could provide motivation, by offering superior unbiased 
service, and could provide access to the data necessary 
for the interface’s operation. 
Alternatively, Alexa, Android, and iOS could be 
regulated as essential facilities in the US, the model for 
regulating airline reservations systems in the 1980s. 
7. Support For Regulatory Actions 
We explored the level of support among consumers 
and among executives for increased levels of regulatory 
protection. We believe that this is essential because it 
provides motivation for regulators as well as insights 
into how proposed regulation will be received and 
which forms of regulation will be effective. 
7.1.Completed Work — Online Behavior of 
Young Users and Parental Concerns 
Not surprisingly students engage in unsafe behav-
ior online, and not surprisingly there is parental support 
for increased protection against data mining their chil-
dren’s online behavior. This was true in all 12 countries 
in which we conducted surveys [8, 10, 11]. 
7.2.Recent Work — EU Executives’ In-
creasing Understanding and Increasing 
Levels of Concern 
 We examined the attitudes of EU executives to-
wards American domination of the net and their domi-
nation of customer-facing online interactions [6, 15]. 
Executives exhibited a range of concerns and a range of 
explanations for this domination. We used ethnographic 
observation and the tools of anthropology to guide our 
work exploring executives’ own concerns.  
 We sought to assess whether executives saw this 
domination as a problem for European firms. Execu-
tives discussed the following issues: (1) Concerns 
rooted in fear of monopoly power regardless of nation-
alities of the owners, (2) Concerns because a small num-
ber of firms controlled critical infrastructure, (3) Con-
cerns because the dominant firms are American and not 
European, (4) Concerns because these firms were not 
subject to European standards of regulation and did not 
adhere to European codes of behavior, or (5) no problem 
at all as long as there was sufficient competition among 
dominant firms. 
 We meet with senior executives from 17 firms in 
Germany, 6 in Denmark and 5 in France and with one 
European regulatory institution. We spoke to individu-
als from 14 different industries. The interviews explored 
enough points of view, from enough industrial sectors, 
to capture the most important questions. 
 The following emerged as executives’ beliefs about 
the sources of initial American domination: 
• Greater risk tolerance of American finance, more fear 
of missing out on the next Google than fear of invest-
ing in another Pets.com 
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• American firm’s greater willingness to risk poten-
tially illegal behavior during periods of regulatory 
ambiguity 
• Privacy policies that allowed American firms huge in-
come streams from privacy mining, not available to 
EU firms 
• Lack of enforcement of antimonopoly law, allowing 
creation of platform monopolies like Android, funded 
in part from privacy mining 
• Competing in a single market with a single language 
and a common culture 
• Competing in a market that had always been more 
open to early adoption of technology 
 The following emerged as executives’ explanations 
for sustained American domination: 
• Continued American privacy mining as a source of 
revenue not available to EU firms 
• Cross-subsidies and funding of additional ventures 
out of these revenues, and the creation of new sources 
of American monopoly power 
• Platform envelopment and the use of American plat-
forms like Android and gateways like Alexa to create 
new sources of monopoly power 
 There is a greater level of concern among EU exec-
utives than we observed previously. There is still a lack 
of consensus on the source of American domination. 
There is also a lack of consensus on how to respond and 
if an effective response is available in the absence of 
regulatory interventions. When executives did believe 
that intervention was possible, they focused on ending 
American firms’ ability to use revenues from privacy 
mining to subsidize new sources of monopoly power, 
and on ending platform envelopment and leveraging 
platforms like Android to exclude competitors. 
7.3.Recent Work — EU Consumers’ Level 
of Concern with Google and Facebook 
We conducted surveys to examine consumers’ atti-
tudes towards new business models and towards firms 
that monetize consumers’ personal information. Sur-
veys assessed consumers’ knowledge of Google’s and 
Facebook’s current business practices and also assessed 
their approval or disapproval of those practices, inde-
pendent of their belief that those practices currently oc-
curred [15, 16]. This allowed us to determine implicit 
informed consent; individuals who both knew of and ap-
proved of these practices. We also studied their willing-
ness to switch to alternative clean services, that is, ser-
vices that do not violate privacy or monetize private in-
formation. We studied their degree of satisfaction with 
regulatory current levels of regulatory protections. We 
saw very little differences among consumers in France, 
Germany, the UK, and the US. When compared to our 
own previous studies, we saw a slight increase in in-
formed consent; this was not due to an increase in con-
sumers who approved of Google’s practices of Google 
and Facebook, and is explained by a slight increase in 
consumers who were now aware of Google’s practices. 
Our study contributes to the design of regulatory poli-
cies to improve consumer welfare by assessing consum-
ers awareness, willingness to take actions to protect 
themselves, and levels of satisfaction with existing reg-
ulatory protections. 
Consumers’ levels of informed consent were quite 
low, averaging 5%, and only once reaching 10% (con-
sumers awareness that Google used GPS positioning in 
making recommendations). Consumers in general were 
not satisfied with the levels of protection they received 
from their regulators’ ability to ensure they were aware 
of company practices, aware of potential for harm, and 
actually protected from harm. Percentages satisfied for 
each question for Facebook were (22.0%, 21.6%, and 
21.2%) and for Google were (23.2%, 24.6%, and 
24.5%).   
However, it is difficult to determine if consumers 
are likely to protect themselves or to approve of regula-
tory actions to protect them. While consumers do ex-
press a preference for safer alternatives, and expressed 
a willingness to switch to them if they were available 
(Facebook, 41.2%, Google 41.5%), very few were will-
ing to pay for safer services (31.5%, 30.6%). Regulatory 
action to protect consumers’ privacy would invariably 
result in higher prices for services, and the value that 
consumers currently place on their privacy appears to be 
quite low. Consumers might be willing to accept costs 
of using newer cleaner services if they were more aware 
of the real but hidden costs of using Facebook and 
Google; that suggests that regulators will find consum-
ers more accepting if regulation is accompanied by ac-
tions that increase transparency and consumer aware-
ness of how they are actually being harmed. Alterna-
tively, the privacy paradox might be quite real, and 
while consumers claim to want more protection they are 
truly unwilling to pay for it. That would suggest very 
limited acceptance of enhanced protection, even protec-
tion that limits uses of data that consumers find danger-
ous or damaging. It would also suggest that increased 
public awareness of abuses by large online platforms 
would not result immediately in reduced usage.  
8. Other Considerations 
Technology and online applications do not respect 
any international borders. Any attempt to regulate West-
ern firms must be approached carefully, or we will crip-
ple our domestic firms and create opportunities for them 
to be replaced by new entrants with worse behavior. 
Regulation is only one approach. Market solutions 
would work if the public’s commercial behavior consid-
ered the impacts to others and avoided harmful exter-
nalities. Unfortunately, the lack of transparency ensures 
that the public is mostly unaware of the harm that Big 
Tech causes. And there is little indication that diffuse 
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harm changes individual behavior. Higher prices that re-
sult from merchants’ key word costs seems an abstract 
and theoretical danger, and the joys of staying in a per-
fectly located Airbnb dominate concerns for displaced 
local residents. Can we implement policy without public 
support? Should we? Do we have the right to do so? 
Other authors have suggested that the moral educa-
tion of the firm, its executives, and its board of directors, 
would lead to a new social contract between firms and 
society. Employees, customers, and society as a whole 
would be included among the firm’s stakeholders, and 
would reduce the role of shareholders, profits, and mar-
ket valuation as metrics of a firm’s performance [26].  
9. Conclusions 
9.1.Contributions 
We have focused on some of the most pressing 
problems facing modern society. We addressed a small 
set of problems that are novel, or newly significant, and 
that are not yet resolved by current regulation. Moreo-
ver, we have explained why these are problems that are 
unlikely to be solved by transparency, by changes in 
consumer behavior, by market forces, or even by a com-
bination of all three. These problems require interdisci-
plinary study. And we have sketched out how some of 
these problems might be approached. 
9.2.Limitations and Suggestions for Future 
Research 
This work is preliminary. It addresses work in five 
of our six phases, but stops short of making policy rec-
ommendations. It is both a summary of completed work 
and a call for further interdisciplinary research. 
Steps forward are based on continued cooperation 
with a diverse set of colleagues globally. We will con-
tinue to seek input from executives, consumers, and the 
platform operators themselves. We will continue to 
work with regulators, principally in Europe, and wher-
ever they appear open to academic suggestions. 
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